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Abstract 
 
We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phe-
nomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiari-
ties of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations 
and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho-
semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat 
Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a so-
lution different from ours in some ways. We have suggested that the representational atomism 
of certain sensory experiences plays a central role in reconstructing the epistemic gap associ-
ated with conscious experience, still, atomism is not the whole story. It needs to be supple-
mented by some additional principles. We also add an account of introspection, and suggest 
some cognitive features that might distinguish representational atoms with phenomenal char-
acter from those without it. 
 
Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, explanatory gap, physicalism, representational atom-
ism, functional unanalyzability, informational psychosemantics, asymmetric causal depend-
ence 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is about phenomenal consciousness and cognitive architecture. In what follows we 
shall argue that acknowledging the epistemic gap between conscious experience and the cor-
responding physical processes does not force us to abandon physicalism. To this extent we 
agree with the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy (Stoljar, 2005). However, we think 
that by focusing at phenomenal concepts, that approach misidentifies the cognitive underpin-
nings of the epistemic gap. Even though epistemic and cognitive principles can explain the 
puzzling phenomena that have traditionally been taken to support dualism, the peculiar char-
acteristics of conscious experience are due to certain cognitive features of the experiences 
themselves, and not to the concepts (phenomenal or other) built upon them. 
 
1.1 Physicalism and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
According to physicalism, there is nothing over and above the physical. As it is often formu-
lated, physicalism is the thesis that every fact is metaphysically supervenient on the physical 
facts. In other words, the physical facts determine all facts. Two possible worlds cannot differ 
in their higher-level (e.g., biological, mental, economic, social) properties without differing in 
their physical properties. 
 Anti-physicalist arguments begin by establishing an epistemic gap between the physical 
world and the phenomenal character of conscious experience claiming that phenomenal truths 
are not necessitated by the complete physical truth. Then follows an inference from the epis-
temic gap to an ontological gap, namely that phenomenal properties are independent of, and 
irreducible to, physical-functional properties (Chalmers, 1996, 2003; Levine, 1983; Jackson, 
1998). 
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is in fact a collection of several different accounts 
(e.g. Balog, 2006; Hill & McLaughlin, 1998; McLaughlin, 2003; Loar, 1990; Papineau, 2002, 
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2007; Perry, 2001; O'Dea, 2002; Tye, 2000, 2003), all of which aim to avoid ontological dual-
ism by invoking conceptual dualism. Representatives of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
(PCS for short) are committed to ontological monism, while claiming that there exists a spe-
cial type of concepts, the so-called phenomenal concepts, which differ importantly from other 
concepts of ours (physical-functional concepts1). 
PCS claims that the epistemic gap is due to a conceptual gap: a gap between our con-
cepts of physical-functional processes on the one hand, and those of phenomenal conscious-
ness on the other. That is, PCS acknowledges the existence of the epistemic gap but then it 
stops short of concluding that this epistemic gap indicates an ontological gap between physi-
cal-functional processes and phenomenal consciousness. According to PCS, the referents of 
both phenomenal and physical-functional concepts are physical-functional states upon which 
we can take two utterly different conceptual perspectives—we can conceive of these states as 
objects of neurological or abstract (causal, functional, structural) descriptions, and we can al-
so conceive of them in terms of how they feel to us upon undergoing them. 
Phenomenal concepts are the vehicles of thought when one thinks of what one’s experi-
ences are like or how it feels to have them. Phenomenal concepts refer to the experiences they 
are concepts of. Their crucial feature is that they are conceptually irreducible to physical-
functional concepts (Loar, 1997, p597; Tye, 2000, p29): phenomenal concepts neither a priori 
imply, nor are a priori implied by physical-functional concepts.  
 
1.2 Our objectives 
All versions of PCS agree that conceptual irreducibility must be accounted for in terms of 
some special features of phenomenal concepts. Different versions of PCS point out slightly 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper, the term ‘physical-functional concepts’ stands for what is often called “physical con-
cepts” or “material concepts” (cf. Papineau, 2002, 2007). These concepts are either role concepts, which refer by 
describing some causal or other role, or directly physical concepts which identify their referents in terms of some 
intrinsic physical feature (mass, charge, etc.). (Papineau, 2002, p.48.) 
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different features as responsible for the epistemic gap. In recent years, PCS has received some 
criticism (Stoljar 2005, Chalmers, 2007; Levine, 2007). Here, however, we shall not claim 
that it is unsuccessful. In fact, we find some of the answers to the objections (Papineau, 2007; 
Levin, 2008) quite convincing. 
 Still, this paper is not a defence of PCS, nor is it a new version of it. Instead, we offer an 
alternative approach to the very same conclusion—namely that cognitive-physicalistic expla-
nations can account for the occurrence of the epistemic gap. We shall shift the focus from 
phenomenal concepts to the properties they are concepts of: we think it is some features of the 
experiences (i.e., sensory-perceptual representations) themselves that explain the epistemic 
gap, and other peculiar features of consciousness. 
 Those familiar with the current standing of the debate about phenomenal consciousness 
might wonder what novelty our proposal might offer. Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere 
have recently proposed an information-theoretic approach to phenomenal consciousness 
(Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005) which achieved something quite similar to what we have just 
proposed. In fact, at first glance the reader might discover a striking similarity between their 
claims and ours. 
 Despite some similarities however, there are important differences between their view 
and ours. In understanding conceptual irreducibility, they focus on the conceptual faculty, 
whereas we focus on the level of sensory representations which form the interface between 
the low-level input modules and the conceptual faculty. In their paper, Aydede and Güzeldere 
mention two independent factors: first that certain sensory experiences represent their stimuli 
as primitive; second, that certain sensory concepts represent the corresponding stimuli as 
primitive. Then, relying on Dretske’s information-theoretic framework, they reach the conclu-
sion that sensory concepts are concepts of a special kind, and this observation subsequently 
serves as their chief explanatory principle. 
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 We think that the conceptual features they investigate are not the genuine causes of the 
special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms which can them-
selves be explained in terms of the features of sensory representational states. For a long time, 
we have had the impression that trying to explain the peculiarities of conscious (perceptual) 
experience by reference to concepts of experience is misguided. In our opinion, it is in the na-
ture of sensory representation where the ultimate explanation of consciousness is to be 
sought. As it turns out, Fodor’s theory of concepts has the expressive power to make this 
point.  
 We think that Aydede and Güzeldere have noticed the important role that experiences 
might play in the explanation, but their Dretskean approach yielded a different focus for them. 
Now we change the focus back to sensory representation by utilizing a theory of concepts on 
which sensory or phenomenal concepts are not in any way special. As we see it, conceptual 
irreducibility does not play any role in accounting for the epistemic gap. In accordance with 
this, Fodor’s framework leaves one no reason to think that concepts of experience are any 
more irreducible to concepts of neurology than the concept of water is irreducible to that of 
H2O. We consider this as an advantage of Fodorian psychosemantics. Accounting for the ep-
istemic gap in terms of the features of sensory representations alone vindicates our claim that 
in the context of phenomenal consciousness, conceptual features are at best explananda but 
not the explanans. 
 
2. Psychosemantic Frameworks 
Our explanation proceeds in terms of cognitive features of experiences and their relation to 
other forms of mental representation. In doing so we shall rely on Fodor’s view of representa-
tion (Fodor, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2008). As we have pointed out, Fodorian psycho-
semantics has some advantages for us over Dretske’s one. However, since Aydede & 
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Güzeldere’s account, which will be our chosen framework of compare and contrast, employs 
Dretske’s psychosemantics, we feel it appropriate to introduce Dretske’s view briefly. 
 
2.1 Aydede,  Güzeldere, and Dreatskean psychosemantics 
According to the Dretskean information-theoretic framework, a source s by being F (i.e., 
some entity s having an attribute F) generates a certain amount of information which is pro-
portional to the (number of) alternative possibilities eliminated. A signal carrying the infor-
mation that s is F carries as much information about s as would be generated by s’s being F 
(Dretske, 1981, p.63). 
 A crucial distinction within the Dretskean framework is the one between digital and an-
alog information. Dretske says that a signal carries the information that s is F in digital form if 
and only if the signal carries no additional information about s. That is, it carries no infor-
mation that is not already nested2 in s’s being F. Contrary to this, if the signal carries addi-
tional information about s (which is not nested in s’s being F) then the signal carries this in-
formation in analog form (cf. Dretske,1981, p.137). As Dretske puts it: “Every signal carries 
information in both analog and digital form. The most specific piece of information the signal 
carries (about s) is the only piece of information it carries (about s) in digital form. All other 
information (about s) is coded in analog form.” (Dretske,1981, p.137.) 
 Information-theoretic psychosemantics works with the following picture of cognitive 
architecture. The sensorium is the imput system of cognition. The sensory system consists of 
transducers and pre-conscious, low-level processors. Transducers convert the physical input 
(different forms of energy) into signals usable by the rest of the sensory system which pro-
cesses the information output by transducers. Sensory representations or experiences form the 
interface between the sensory system and the cognitive system—they are the outputs pro-
duced by the sensory system and the inputs consumed by the central cognitive/conceptual sys-
                                                
2 The information that t is G is nested in s’s being F iff s’s being F carries the information that t is G. 
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tem (which in turn controls behavior). Particular sensory representations deliver information 
about distal layouts (object represented) to the conceptual system. 
 Suppose one sees a red apple on a kitchen table. One’s eye converts electromagnetic 
waves into neurochemical signals which are further processed by visual input modules. The 
output of this process is a sensory representation. The information it carries about the red ap-
ple in digital form is very detailed and rich (presenting the specific form of the apple, the tex-
ture and shades of its surface, etc.). Nested in this very detailed information there is less spe-
cific information implied by it (like the shape and predominant color of the apple). The con-
ceptual system virtually always utilizes some analog information nested in the digital infor-
mation carried by sensory representations. That is, the conceptual system extracts information 
nested in the information carried by sensory representations in digital form. 
 Aydede and Güzeldere distinguish three classes of concepts: observational concepts 
like APPLE, perceptual concepts like ROUND, and sensory concepts like RED, based on the 
abstraction/ digitalization distance between sensory representations and concepts based on 
them. The digitalization distance between observational concepts and their sensory base is the 
greatest of the three because these concepts deliver information that can be extracted from 
many sensory representations with widely different digital informational contents. Abstrac-
tion distance is minimal for sensory concepts because their digital informational content is 
also part of the digital informational content of the sensory representations they are acquired 
from (cf. Aydede and Güzeldere, 2005, pp.206-208). 
 On this account, the semantic content of a concept is identified with the most specific 
information it carries, i.e. the information it carries in digital form, whereas the informational 
content of a concept is the information carried in digital form plus all the information nested 
in the digital content (cf. Aydede and Güzeldere, 2005, p.205).  Consider our previous exam-
ple again. When one sees a red apple, one part of one’s complex sensory representation, the 
experience of red (hereafter E-red), carries information about the color of the apple. The com-
Fazekas & Jakab – Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture 
 
9 
plex sensory representation enters one’s conceptual system, which extracts information nested 
in the digital content of this representation. The sensory concept RED is acquired from E-red. 
Since sensory representations are the sources of information entry to the conceptual system 
with multiple possible venues (different modalities, different dimensions, etc.), they them-
selves are information generating sources (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p.223) whose infor-
mation is picked up by the conceptual system. Thus the tokening of RED carries information 
about the specific sensory representation E-red. RED, then, carries information about redness 
by carrying information about E-red. The informational content of RED is the ordered pair 
{redness, E-red} (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p.216). One of the fundamental claims by 
Aydede & Güzeldere is that the very same structure with this dual informational content gets 
utilized when one attends to one’s environment (as a sensory concept), and when one intro-
spects (as a phenomenal concept). They argue that the semantic content of the sensory con-
cept is rendess, whereas the semantic content of phenomenal concepts is E-red.  
 
2.2 Fodorian psychosemantics for our background 
According to Fodor, the semantic content, or meaning, of concept C is the property C is 
asymmetrically causally dependent on. Suppose that two different types of causes A and B 
can activate a mental representation R. R is asymmetrically causally dependent on A, as op-
posed to B, just in case breaking the A à   R causal link also breaks the B à  R link as well, 
whereas breaking the B à R link leaves the A à R link unaffected (Fodor, 1990). In this 
case A is the primary cause, whereas B a secondary cause. Later Fodor refers to asymmetric 
causal dependence as (nomic) locking of concepts to the properties they represent (Fodor, 
1998, 2008). 
 In what follows, a notion of key importance will be representational atomism. A repre-
sentational state R is atomic iff its vehicle does not have proper parts that are interpreted as 
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representations by the processor that processes it. In other words, R is an unstructured repre-
sentation. Thus representational atomism is a syntactic property. Representational atoms may 
have complex contents, for instance, by indicating some complex state of affairs. That an air-
plane is about to land on an airport may be indicated by a red light on an instrument panel (an 
unstructured representation) as well as being recorded by a camera and displayed on a screen 
(a complex representation).3 
Mentalese consists of concepts and compositional formulas. Propositional knowledge 
relates concepts to one another, e.g., All bachelors are unmarried; Dogs bark, etc. However, 
complex concepts must be allowed as well, within this framework (see Fodor, 2008, pp 18, 
20, 43-45; 59-60). It is easy to see why this is so. Even though LOT endorses representational 
atomism (for the vast majority of concepts), due to the compositionality it also endorses, it 
must also allow for the combination of concepts. If one possesses the concepts HEAVY and 
BOOK, plus the ability to think, nothing can prevent one from combining the two thus 
arriving at HEAVY BOOK. Something is a heavy book iff it is heavy and it is a book4, and it 
is possible to store these two predicates linked together in one’s mental lexicon. Similarly for 
many other cases of conceptual combination. The moral is, if it is possible to build up 
propositional representations in LOT using atomic concepts, then complex concepts will be 
an unavoidable consequence. 
Possessing an atomic concept all by itself does not license any inference. BACHELOR 
all by itself does not afford the subject the inference that bachelors are unmarried. Possessing 
both BACHELOR and UNMARRIED still does not afford such an inference. One needs to 
                                                
3 Fodor (1987, 1998, 2008) is not the only author who emphasized the importance of representational atomism. 
A version of concept atomism has been developed by Margolis (1999). In the context of consciousness, the role 
of atomic representations (concepts as well as experiences) has recently been explored by Kulvicki (2005) and 
Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005). 
4 In fact, the semantic analysis here is a little more complex. HEAVY BOOK is reasonably analyzed not as 
HEAVY & BOOK, but as HEAVY FOR A BOOK (just like RED HAIR is better analyzed as RED FOR HAIR, 
and not as RED & HAIR). Something is a heavy book iff it is a book and it is on the heavy side relative to 
books.  Similarly, something is red hair iff it is hair and its color is more similar to prototypical red than most 
other hair samples. 
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relate the two concepts by means of propositional knowledge; for instance one needs to learn 
independently that bachelors are unmarried. This latter item of knowledge is not part of the 
possession conditions of either BACHELOR or UNMARRIED, according to Fodor. (For the 
possession conditions of BACHELOR is for it to be nomically locked to bachelors, and the 
possession conditions for UNMARRIED is for it to be nomically locked to unmarried people. 
That these locking relations obtain does not confer the subject with the disposition to infer 
UNMARRIED from BACHELOR.) 
Fodor also holds that reference is the only parameter of content (Fodor, 1990a, b;1998; 
2008, ch. 3). He is also optimistic about the compositionality of reference (Fodor, 2008, p56). 
Whether or how reference composes is a difficult issue that we cannot settle in this paper; we 
simply note that Fodor supposes so, and that the direct reference theory of meaning has a long 
history (see e.g., Stainton, 1996, 29-61; Neale, 1990; Kripke, 1979, 1980, Larson and Ludlow, 
1993; May and Fiengo, 1996, 1998; Putnam, 1975). 
In Fodor’s theory, concepts are atomic symbols of Mentalese, but they are associated 
with a file, which is a placeholder with two slots: one for a perceptual prototype (we shall call 
it the P-slot), and the other for abstract knowledge (let it be the A-slot).5 However, files are 
not constitutive of concepts; concepts are the atomic symbols locked to the property they are 
the concepts of. If one wants to explain what a given concept means, what one can do is 
report the contents of the associated file. If the A-slot in the concept’s file is not empty, this 
can help explaining the concept’s meaning. Thus, the representational content of most 
concepts is complex, and thanks to the associated file, the complexities of content are often 
readily accessible to cognitive processing. However, this is not necessarily so on Fodor’s 
theory, since the associanted files may in some cases be next to empty. 
 
 
                                                
5 See also Margolis, 1999. 
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2.3 Concepts and experiences 
Fodor (2008 Ch 6) agrees that there exist nonconceptual representations, and that they carry 
Dretskean information about their cause. In his view, it is possible to register the Dretskean 
information that s is F without possessing the concept F. For example, one can undergo an 
experience of red without tokening RED (op.cit, 186). However, whereas for Dretske it is 
information extraction or digitalization that gives rise to concepts, Fodor maintains that one 
needs to possess concepts in the first place to extract information from experience. 
Recovering information from preconceptual representation presupposes concept possession, 
he claims (p180).6 
It is also arguable that sensory experiences, just like concepts, are asymmetrically 
causally dependent on their stimuli (Tye, 2000, p140; 142 note 25). For example, E-red in 
some subject’s mind can be tokened by TOMATO tokenings (and other secondary causes) 
only if it can be reliably tokened by red surfaces (the primary cause) in the first place. In cases 
of rod monochromacy or cortical achromatopsia, TOMATO tokenings can never token E-red, 
exactly because red surfaces cannot do so either. In the color-sighted, red surfaces can token 
E-red, and TOMATO tokenings may or may not be able to do so.  
Percepts and concepts are two distinct types of representation on the present account. 
According to Fodor (2008, Ch 6) iconic (i.e., low-level perceptual) representations are such 
that each and every part of them is also one of their constituents, whereas for discursive 
representations this is not the case. He later adds (192) that our conscious percepts are not to 
be thought of as iconic representations. For a conscious visual percept is a product of 
subpersonal encapsulated (S/E) inference. For example, the operation of perceptual constancy 
principles that help to identify distal stimulus properties like shape, size, and color, 
presupposes S/E inference.  
                                                
6 The Dretskean notion of information extraction is parallelled by information recovery in Fodor’s usage (2008, 
p180). 
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Tye (2008) holds a slightly different view of perceptual representation. He claims 
(pp12-15) that phenomenally conscious states are such that they directly, that is, non-
inferentially enable the subject to wonder ”What that is” with respect to some entity. In other 
words, conscious seeing makes it possible for the subject to form de re propositional attitudes 
about an entity, and do so without using any collateral information (i.e., information not 
supplied by the perceptual experience in question. The mere possibility of attitude formation 
is enough; actual wondering is not required. Conscious seeing, according to Tye, need not be 
an inferential process. This is a minor difference between Fodor’s and Tye’s views, which is 
interesting because Tye, holds a counterfactualist view of representational content similar to 
Fodor’s one (Tye, 2000, p140, 142 n 25).7 We need not settle this issue here. All we are going 
to suppose is that focusing attention, and object recognition/ identification (which is closely 
related to attentional focus), already presuppose concept deployment. Conscious percepts thus 
either involve concept tokenings, or predispose the subject to token concepts and to form 
propositional attitudes. Preconceptual representations in turn supply information that can be 
recovered by concepts. 
Seeing a red triangle can token both RED and TRIANGLE, plus the de re judgment 
that That triangle is red. Seeing a particular dog on a given occasion can also token (i) a 
number of concepts (syntactic atoms): DOG, FURRY, BIG, WHITE, SCARY etc.; (ii) de re 
judgments such as Sure that scares me; and (iii) de dicto judgments like Dogs are furry, and 
so on. Moreover, the concept tokenings in these examples count as acts of recognition (i.e., 
activation of the concepts by their primary cause, that is, instances of the type of thing that 
they mean), as opposed to accidental association (i.e., activation by other causes that are 
asymmetrically dependent on the primary cause). When the sight of a red triangle tokens 
RED, by this tokening the subject recognizes that the object seen is red. Similarly, on seeing a 
big, white, furry, dog growling at one, the tokening of DOG, FURRY, BIG, WHITE, and 
                                                
7 Although Tye (2008) has changed his views about content to some extent, his new theory is still. 
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SCARY count as recognizing the relevant properties of the object of perception. However, 
seeing a dog may also token CAT in one’s mind, which does not count as recognition, but 
rather as an accidental association – that is, activation by one of the concept’s secondary 
causes. 
We think some sensory representations are representationally atomic, similarly to 
Fodorian concepts. Somewhat loosely speaking, E-red is an atomic sensory representation 
(we shall refine this notion in the next section). By contrast, seeing a scene with a dog as in 
the above example gives rise to a highly complex visual representation. Atomic percepts like 
E-red can token much less concepts by way of recognition than complex visual representa-
tions. A token of E-red can activate RED, SATURATED, and DARK, for instance, all three 
being attributes that the experience veridically represents its object as having. Even though 
the surface that is being veridically represented by E-red has a complex surface reflectance 
property, due to its unstructured nature E-red does not make these complexities in the stimuli 
available to cognition in any way.  
This is the idea of information extraction translated to Fodorian terminology. By this 
exercise we wish to emphasize both the generality of some of the claims made by both 
Aydede & Güzeldere and ourselves, and some important differences between the two views. 
The similarities turn on the fact that representational atomism is a syntactic phenomenon in 
the first place. Syntactic atoms need not be semantically primitive, still they do not make the 
complexities in their semantic content accessible to further processing. The differences 
between the two views are more subtle, however, they are quite important. It is these 
differences to which we now turn. 
 
2.4 Fodorian psychosemantics: just for fun or is there a point? 
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According to Aydede and Güzeldere (2005, 212), whereas sensory concepts are necessarily 
acquired from the experiences sensorially representing the properties they denote, 
observational concepts are typically, but not necessarily, acquired from experiences of their 
objects. They can be acquired from descriptions as well. The reason for this asymmetry, 
according to Aydede and Güzeldere, is that the information about stimuli contained in atomic 
experiences (for example, the information about the property redness contained in E-red) 
cannot be completely digitalized by the conceptual system. In other words, sensory concepts 
like RED cannot carry information about the environmental properties they represent without 
thereby carrying information about the corresponding sensory experience (such that the 
information about the distal cause is nested in that about the experience). Not so for 
observational concepts, however: TRUCK, or APPLE can be acquired from a whole host of 
quite different experiences of trucks and apples respectively, which all carry more specific 
information about the object than the two generic concepts mentioned (e.g., red apple with 
tiny spots from one side, on a kitchen table). A lot of this more specific information is ignored 
when APPLE is acquired, therefore a tokening of APPLE by an apple will not carry 
information about any particular apple experience (because there is no lawful covariation 
between APPLE and any particular type of apple experience). 
 This leads to a problem with Dretskean psychosemantics. According to Dretske, a 
necessary condition for a piece of information to count as the semantic content of a concept is 
for it to be completely digitalized. According to the definition (Aydede and Güzeldere, 2005, 
213; Dretske, 1981, 185), a concept C has as its semantic content the fact that s is F (and so 
the information that s is F is completely digitalized by S) just in case (i) C carries the 
information that s is F, and (ii) C carries no other piece of information t is G in which the 
information that s is F is nested.8 But, as we have seen, information about the stimuli of 
                                                
8 Applied to this case, nesting means that S carries information about b being G because b being G itself carries 
information about s being F. 
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sensory concepts (e.g., colors) cannot be completely digitalized by sensory concepts, because 
sensory concepts carry information about the corresponding experiences, and only via those 
experiences do they carry information about their stimuli. As a result, Dretskean 
psychosemantics cannot supply the right kind of content assignment for sensory concepts, 
namely information about the corresponding environmental stimulus. 
 As Aydede and Güzeldere remark (243, n35), Fodor’s asymmetric dependency 
condition also fails to achieve the correct content assignment for sensory concepts. For, they 
contend, breaking the law between the sensory representation of red and the concept RED 
will break the law between the property of redness and RED, but not vice versa.  
 We disagree. On closer scrutiny, Fodor’s account does turn out to provide the right 
semantics for sensory concepts. Here is the argument. RED is supposed to be 
asymmentrically dependent on redness, but not on E-red. Now, breaking the E-red to RED 
link clearly need not break the redness-RED link. Consider the case of a rod monochromat (or 
a subject with cortical achromatopsia). Since, in these kinds of mind, RED may still be 
nomically locked to redness via spectrophotometer use or expert aid, even though E-red 
cannot token RED, redness still can. RED in this case will not be a sensory concept (as 
defined by Aydede and Güzeldere), but it will still be a color concept.9 
However, breaking the redness-RED counterfactual dependence does break the E-red 
to RED link as well. Suppose a rod monochromat has neither access to color experts 
(including people blessed with normal color vision), nor to spectrophotometers. Nor does she 
have abstract knowledge of red as a particular surface color, to support the redness-RED 
locking. However, a microelectrode is permanently inserted in her V4 such that she can 
stimulate her own brain, which results in certain interesting experiences, namely tokenings of 
E-red. She likes those experiences, and wonders what they might be for; however, all by 
                                                
9 In this case the file associated with RED contains abstract knowledge (its A-slot is filled properly), but no 
perceptual prototype (the P-slot is empty). 
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itself, E-red will never token (or trigger10) RED in her mind. If her color vision gets restored, 
then her E-red tokenings will be integrated in her visual percepts of shape, space and motion, 
which supplies her a lot of additional information about the function of E-red. That (i.e., E-red 
plus perceptual integration; seeing red surfaces) will lock RED to redness in her mind. Thus 
if the redness-RED counterfactual link is not in place, E-red cannot token RED either. 
Now consider Mary in her chamber. The redness-RED link is in place in her mind 
(e.g., she could use remote-control spectrophotometers to measure the color of objects outside 
her chamber). If presented with a red patch on white paper (Nida-Rümelin, 1995), she likely 
would not be able to tell what color it is. However, on seeing a red tomato in color for the first 
time in her life, Mary would be able to recognize it by shape, and infer that the color it has is 
red.11 
Moral: if the redness-RED link is not in place, then E-red cannot token RED. If, on the 
other hand, RED is properly locked to redness, then E-red may or may not be able to trigger 
RED, depending on the circumstances. This is exactly what Fodor’s theory requires. Locking 
is supposed to be multiply realizable (Fodor, 2008, Ch 6, 7; 1998, Ch 6). 
Ultimate moral: on Fodorian psychosemantics, there is no special class of sensory 
concepts. RED is no different from TRUCK or APPLE.12 The consequence is that we better 
                                                
10 Triggering is the event of locking an innate proto-concept to the property it represents.  
11 The concept of an experience of red (E-RED) works similarly to concepts of color. Fodorian concepts of color 
experience are nomically locked to color experiences. Mary’s concepts of color experience (while in her 
chamber) satisfy this constraint as well as anyone else’s. Her only difference from the color-sighted is that the 
locking of E-RED to E-red in her case is not mediated by a perceptual prototype. It is mediated by her abstract 
knowledge and use of brain imaging equipment  (see above). 
12 Here is an interesting technical problem. Suppose Mary’s concept E-RED is locked to E-red via abstract 
knowledge and use of equipment: she recognizes occurrences of E-red in other people’s brains via brain 
imaging. Now suppose that, at a later date, she sees a red spot on a sheet of white paper, for the first time in her 
life. As we have seen, she is unlikely to recognize her experience evoked by the spot as an instance of E-RED. 
Even though this first occurrence of E-red in her own brain is an instance of the primary cause of E-RED, and E-
RED is already locked to E-red in her mind, still this particular instance of the primary cause cannot token E-
RED in her mind. Does not this mean that sensory concepts like E-RED are special after all? Fortunately it does 
not. Consider locking via deference. I cannot recognize elm trees or tell gold from brass, but experts can help me 
doing so. Suppose that, on a few occasions, a goldsmith has sorted jewelry for me in two classes: brass and gold. 
I witnessed the process, but this did not enable me to subsequently do it alone. That is, my GOLD concept is 
locked to gold via deference, but not perceptual recognition. Locking entails that gold can, in certain ways, token 
GOLD in my mind; but it is not a requirement that gold can token GOLD in my mind via any of the relevant 
psychological mechanisms. For instance, if GOLD is locked to gold via deference in my mind, then it is not a 
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attempt a cognitive analysis of sensory experiences themselves, instead of concepts of 
experiences, in trying to account for the peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness. For 
instance, when we wish to explain why Mary in her chamber cannot come to know what it is 
like to see colors, it is not concepts that play the lead. It is sensory experiences that do so. 
 
3. Special Features of Experiences and Cognitive Architecture 
3.1 Structured versus unstructured representations 
Someone who has visual memories of horses and straight horns with a thread-like pattern on 
their surface can visually imagine, thereby come to know, how a unicorn looks, based on the 
description “An unicorn is like a horse with a straight horn on its forehead”. Mary in her 
chamber, however, cannot imagine what seeing red is like, no matter what other descriptions 
and experiences she might recall from her memory (she cannot recall any memories of color). 
Seeing a unicorn is a complex experience that carries a lot of information about spatial struc-
ture that can also be recovered by concepts. One could generate lengthy and relevant descrip-
tions of what unicorns are like, on the basis of a unicorn picture. 
 Take another example. The experience of seeing a day-old chick could not be like 
what it is without certain information about spatial structure being conveyed in the experi-
ence. Moreover, this structure can be adequately captured by descriptions. The stimulus is 
complex (e.g., the chick has two legs, a beak, etc.) and the experience makes this complexity 
available to cognition. Now compare E-red. Its stimulus is complex too (it is a type of surface 
reflectance), still E-red does not make this complexity available to cognition in any way.  
 We say that a perceptual representation possesses constituent structure iff (1) it has 
discernible aspects or attributes (discernible at least for trained subjects) which (2) can occur 
                                                                                                                                                   
requirement in Fodor’s theory that I must be able to recognize gold all by myself. Mutatis mutandis for Mary’s 
concept E-RED and her first experience of red. 
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as experiences on their own as well as in other perceptual experiences.13 Constituent structure 
in most cases has the function of mapping some structure of the represented object: the pat-
tern of relations among representational constituents conveys information about a certain ex-
ternal pattern of relations in the environment. So for example it is possible to discern the ex-
perience of seeing the leg of a day-old chick as a constituent part of the experience of seeing 
the day-old chick, and it is also possible to experience an appropriately shaped leg on its own 
without necessarily experiencing the day-old chick. 
 Shape experiences, in general, have constituent structure. First, visual experiences of 
virtually all shapes have discernible parts or aspects that can be undergone on their own, that 
is, independently of other parts of the same experience. Second, at least a number of current 
accounts of visual shape representation are based on the notion of constituent structure, that 
is, on a generative system of representational primitives and rules of combination for them 
(Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987, 1990; Wallis and Bülthoff, 1999; see also Palmer, 1999a, Ch. 
8).14 
 On the other hand, some perceptual representations are unstructured. These atomic 
sensory represnetations possess no structure, nor do they map the structure of the represented 
object. Atomic sensory representations only indicate the presence presence of the represented 
object — they are ‘inner light bulbs’ which reliably go on whenever a complex state of affairs 
obtains in the environment. 
 Atomic sensory representations have no discernible parts which could occur as 
standalone experiences. Still, some such experiences have dimensional positions, or Primitive 
Sensory Features (PSFs). In general, PSFs of a perceptual representation are discernible 
attributes of it which (i) cannot occur as standalone experiences, and (ii) have no discernible 
                                                
13 That is, they are shareable in Fodor’s sense (Fodor, 1987). 
14 On Biederman’s account, for instance, visual representations of complex shapes are based on 36 different 
geons – primitives of shape representation – and their combinations. According to Palmer (op.cit., pp. 406-7) 
those models that encode shape in terms of hierarchically organized structural descriptions based on some set of 
shape primitives, have more power than others to explain phenomena of three-dimensional shape perception. 
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experiential features other than themselves; in other words, they have no representational 
structure whatsoever. 
  Color experiences, at least unique hue experiences, are reasonably regarded as repre-
sentationally atomic.15 Unique hue experiences have dimensional positions (hue, saturation, 
and lightness16) which are discernible but none of them can occur as stand-alone experiences 
(for instance, one cannot have an experience of saturation without some hue and lightness). 
Hue, saturation and lightness are the PSFs of color experiences.17 
 
3.2 Encapsulation 
So far we have seen that some of our experiences are unstructured; lack of constituent struc-
ture characterizes atomic sensory representations, whereas lack of more than one discernible 
attribute characterizes PSFs. A refinement needs to be added to this picture. 
 Consider the following objection. Unique hue experiences as they are accessed by high-
er cognition—that is, attention, recall from episodic memory, making choices based on color 
perception, verbal report, or silent introspection—are representationally unstructured, and 
their chromatic contents are primitive sensory features. However, unique hue experiences are 
unstructured only for certain cognitive processors—faculties that we attribute to higher cog-
nition. From a bottom-up perspective these experiences come about as a result of highly com-
plex processing which includes the generation of opponent signals, mechanisms of color con-
stancy, and additional transformations which produce perceived color similarity (Maloney, 
                                                
15 Although it is possible to argue that the experience of orange is a perceptual mixture of two other color expe-
riences which are plausibly its constituents, namely red and yellow (Boynton, 1997; Tye, 2000, pp. 162-165), 
this view is not generally accepted (Hardin, 1988, p. 43; Thompson, 2000, p. 171; see also Jakab, 2000, 2006). 
16 An alternative characterization of the dimensions is  lightness, redness-greenness, and yellowness-blueness. 
17 In the auditory domain pure sine-wave tones are good candidates for being atomic sensory representations. 
They have features like loudness, pitch and timbre. None of these are  constituents as they cannot occur as 
standalone experiences. Loudness and pitch are dimensional positions. Timbre seems more complex than a sin-
gle sensory dimension.  It arises from representing the overtones of a fundamental frequency, still all the over-
tones that contribute to timbre are not discernible one by one. A trained musician may be able to list the keys 
that sound in a piano chord, but not those frequencies that determine the characteristic timbre of a violoncello as 
opposed to a piano. 
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1986, 1999, 2002, 2003; Maloney and Wandell, 1986; Wuerger et al., 1995). These processes 
involve a number of different stages in the visual system from the retina to area V4 of the vis-
ual cortex (DeValois and DeValois, 1997; Wooten and Miller, 1997; Abramov, 1997; Da-
vidoff, 1997; Zeki, 1999, Ch18). Viewed from this perspective, unique hue experiences ap-
pear rather structured states of the mind. So what exactly does it mean to be an unstructured 
perceptual representation? 
 Reply. The levels of visual processing at which singular color experiences are struc-
tured are modular and encapsulated, therefore inaccessible to conscious reflection. Mary, for 
instance, might well know about the firing patterns and information flow at low levels of vis-
ual processing. Still her knowledge of these processes—propositional representations in high-
er cognition—cannot interact with the corresponding processes themselves (representations in 
early visual processing) therefore it cannot elicit, or influence, those processes in any way. 
For such an interaction to take place, a sufficiently direct and detailed information transfer 
would be required between these two levels of representation. This kind of information trans-
fer certainly does not obtain between color processing and propositional representation. Think 
of the formation of opponent signals that happens between the retina and the primary visual 
cortex (Mollon, 2000); mechanisms of color constancy that seem to take place between the 
primary visual cortex and area V4 (Zeki, 1999, Ch. 18); and the perceived similarity relations 
of the colors which come about as a result of intricate and encapsulated processing – a trans-
formation of the so-called LMS space (McLeod and Boynton, 1979) into color space (Werner 
and Wooten, 1979; Hunt, 1982; Hardin, 1988; Wuerger et al., 1995; Matthen, 1999). The rea-
son why encapsulation in these cases is obvious is that it took substantial empirical inquiry to 
uncover these aspects of color processing. Making these discoveries required scientists to 
look at the visual system from a third-person perspective. What experiments and abstract the-
orising did reveal about color vision, armchair reflection alone did not, because color-
processing in the brain is inaccessible to conscious reflection. Nor can top-down conceptual 
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influence build up these low-level, intra-modular visual processes of color vision which result 
in color experiences. There is no “top-down tampering” with the complex events inside an 
encapsulated low level process no matter how rich the conceptual level gets. Conclusion: rep-
resentational atomism is processor-relative.  
 
4. Our Account at work 
Now we are in a position to see how our account unfolds. The next four subsections summa-
rize our proposed solution to the problem of conscious experience. Subsection 4.1 begins with 
some technical details the importance of which is summarized at the end. The remaining three 
subsections get straight down to the central problems. 
 
4.1 Atomism and causal role exchange 
In general, an atomic mental representations RA can assume different causal/functional roles 
in the same cognitive system at different times. Also, different tokens of RA can assume 
different causal roles in cognitive systems of the same type.18 This claim is far from obvious, 
therefore it will be argued in this section. The conclusion we shall draw from it is that 
representational atoms cannot be uniquely characterized by their causal/functional role in a 
given type of system. That is, if two representational atoms A1 and A2 in system S are such 
that A1 plays causal role R1 whereas A2 plays role R2, then S could be redesigned so that A1 
plays R2 and A2 plays R1, while S’s input-output relations are unaffected and its inner 
structure and functioning also remains the same except the causal hookup of A1 and A2 to the 
rest of the system. 
 Our argument for this claim is based on discussing two cases of causal role exchange: 
color experience inversion, and role exchange between conceptual atoms vs. complex 
                                                
18 In speaking about causal/ functional role exchange, we mean narrow functional individuation in Harman’s 
sense (Harman, 1988). 
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formulas of Mentalese.  
 
(1) Color experience inversion. Suppose someone wears red-green inverting corneal implants 
(permanent contact lenses) from birth. To such a subject ripe tomatoes would look the way 
grass looks to the rest of the trichromat population, and this would also be reflected in their 
inverted neural responses to stimuli. Moreover, this kind of inversion might be approximately 
behaviorally undetectable (that is, detectable only in the laboratory, but not in everyday life: 
see Byrne, 2007, esp. note 15; Palmer, 1999b). Here is how color experience inversion should 
be understood. Color experience inversion has to be systematic, in order to be approximately 
undetectable: a whole dimension of color space has to be inverted, or re-mapped onto color 
stimuli. If two singular points (or small regions) of color space exchange their stimuli while 
leaving the rest of the points intact, that would make this sort of inversion easily detectable. 
Figure 1 helps to understand this point.  
 
 
Figure 1. The detectability of two-point inversion. The top row shows the “real colors” of stimuli in a hypothet-
ical color perception experiment. The second row shows the veridical percepts of a subject with normal color 
vision. The third row shows how a red-green invert would see the stimuli. The fourth row presents the percep-
tions of a point-invert: only the most saturated reds and greens are inverted; the rest of the R-G dimension is 
perceived normally. Notice that in a color discrimination experiment the point invert (bottom row) sees a big 
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color difference between the leftmost stimulus and the second one from left (the same is true of the rightmost 
one and its neighbor), whereas the color-normal subject and the standard red-green invert subject agree that there 
is only a little color difference between these stimuli. That is, point inversion is much easier to detect behavior-
ally than standard (whole-dimension)  inversion. 
 
Question: can we interpret standard color experience inverison as a role exchange between 
two representationally atomic states? It seems that the answer is no, since in standard 
inversion many color experiences (in the example, all reds and greens) change their roles in 
indicating stimuli, not just two of them. But we can look at this case in a different way. 
Sensed redness and sensed greenness are two antagonistic channel signals in color processing 
that can be activated to different degrees and whose different activation levels constitute the 
chromatic values of particular red and green sensations. (Above we also called sensed redness 
and greenness primitive sensory features, or PSFs.) For instance, low activity of the redness-
signal characterizes unsaturated reds, and blues with a tinge of red; perceptions of saturated 
red are due to high activity of the same PSF. Mutatis mutandis for green sensations. Thus in 
red-green color experience inversion it is the sensed-red-PSF and the sensed-green-PSF that 
exchange roles: their activity distributions over color stimuli switch places. In addition, their 
connections with memory and behavioral dispositions must also change to complete the role 
inversion.19 
 
(2) Role switch between conceptual atoms. Take two atomic symbols of Mentalese, X and Y. 
Suppose that, in Paige’s mind, X is locked to spoons, and has an associated file containing a 
                                                
19 Color experience inversion is possible. First, we might be able to design permanent red-green inverting contact 
lenses in the future that can be applied to babies who then grow up never taking it off (not that designing such an 
equipment will ever be a priority of humankind, but that’s irrelevant). Second, complete behavioral undetectabil-
ity of inversion may not be possible due to asymmetries of color space (Hilbert and Kalderon, 2000). This is a 
debated issue: Palmer (1999b) suggests that behaviorally undetectable red-green spectrum inversion may be pos-
sible; Hardin (1998) disagrees. However, even if completely undetectable color experience inversion is not pos-
sible, nearly undetectable versions (i.e., undetectable in everyday life, only detectable in the laboratory) do seem 
possible (Byrne, 2007, esp. note 15). 
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perceptual prototype of spoons and relevant abstract knowledge. Also in Paige’s mind, Y is 
locked to knives and has an associated file with proper contents. However, in Quillan’s mind, 
X is locked to knives and is associated with the knife-file, whereas Y is locked to spoons and 
has the spoon file associated with it. Point: if the Fodorian view of concepts (in which atomic 
concepts are locked to the properties they represent and are associated with relevant 
knowledge) is right, then the role switch just sketched seems straightforwardly possible.  
 What complicates this picture a bit is Fodor’s claim that concepts are innate. On Fodor’s 
most recent, and admittedly metaphorical formulation of concept nativism (Fodor, 2008, 159), 
(i) we can learn stereotypes and (ii) we have an innate attractor space populated with point 
attractors (this is the core metaphor). Innate concepts are these attractors (p160; 162), and 
learned stereotypes are positioned in this attractor space. If a given stereotype is sufficiently 
close to a point attractor AP, then it becomes the stereotype of the concept that AP is; thereby 
AP gets locked to the environmental property of which it is the innate (proto-)concept.  
 This picture raises some well-known questions like the DOORKNOB/doorknob 
problem which we now set aside.20 All that we want to show here is that a role switch 
between two concepts is conceivable even in this nativist framework. Concepts have two 
aspects. First, they are points in the attractor space; their identity is conferred by their 
location. Second, concepts are the syntactic entities with distinctive shape properties that enter 
cognitive processing.21 Perhaps these two aspects of concepts constitute a coherent view; so 
we assume in this paper. But one thing needs to be noted: syntactic shape on the one hand, 
and location in the attractor landscape on the other need to correspond to one another. 
Location is crucial in locking; syntactic shape is crucial in processing. If a symbol is locked to 
dogs, it has to be processed accordingly. However, such a correspondence is surely 
contingent. Suppose that, in little Paige's brain, symbol D gets locked to dogs: it is anchored 
                                                
20 The problem is, how is it that a good stereotype of environmental property P will ipso facto be close to the 
attractor (i.e., concept) to which it belongs?  
21 ”Very roughly: one thinks in file names”,  says Fodor (2008, p143, note 15; see also Ch 3). 
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to the dog-point in the innate attractor space as she learns the dog-prototype. Subsequently 
she acquires the belief that dogs bark, which is coded in her mind by the Mentalese formula 
∀x(Dx à   BARKx). Quillan, however, has slightly different genetics: in his mind it is 
symbol C that gets anchored to the dog-point; therefore, when he acquires the belief that dogs 
bark, ∀x(Cx à   BARKx) will be the mentalese formula which represents the corresponding 
proposition. The role switch generalizes to all other beliefs of theirs, which is just to say the 
syntactic atoms C and D have swapped causal roles. DOG will be D in Paige's mind and C in 
Quillan's.22 
 By contrast, complex concepts and mentalese formulas cannot in general switch causal 
roles. Suppose a complex Mentalese formula FC1 has the logical form A&B&C whereas FC2 
has the form A&BorC. In this case FC1 entails entails each and every one of its conceptual 
constituents, whereas FC2 does not. This is a structural constraint which prevents them from 
playing identical computational/inferential roles in different minds of roughly the same 
type.23 
 Although causal role exchange between representational atoms within the same system 
seems to be a coherent idea, it does not follow that in adult subjects’ minds such an exchange 
can easily happen. For two atomic concepts to actually exchange roles, all their causal/ infer-
                                                
22 Margolis (1999) agrees with Fodor about concept atomism, but he thinks that concepts need not be innate; 
they can be learned. Such a view makes causal role inversion between different concepts even easier to 
understand than Fodor’s nativism.  
23 What remains true is that two complex but isomorphical Mentalese formulas can switch causal roles if all 
their atomic conceptual constituents switch causal roles. Two structured concepts or Mentalese formulas CS1 
and CS2 are syntactically isomorphic just in case they differ only in their atomic conceptual constituents (names 
or predicates), but the ordering of their constituents is the same, including identical logical constants in 
corresponding positions. Identity of logical form is a guide to syntactic isomorphism: isomorphism obtains iff 
there is a one-to-one mapping between the atomic conceptual constituents of CS1 and CS2 such that replacing 
the constituents of CS1 according to the mapping scheme yields CS2 (and vice versa). For example, suppose that 
CS1 is (A&D) à   G and CS2 is (B&F)à   G. In this case the mapping is {A ó B; D ó  F; G ó  G}. Now 
take two syntactically isomorphic formulas like DOGS BARK and CATS MEOW (say, ∀x[DOG(x)à   
BARK(x)] and ∀x[CAT(x)à   MEOW(x)] in Mentalese respectively). Suppose that in Paige’s mind DOG is 
Mentalese symbol D, and  CAT is symbol C, BARK comes from locking symbol B to barking things, and 
MEOW from locking M to meowing things. In Quillan’s mind, however, DOG is C locked to dogs, CAT is D, 
locked to cats, BARK is M locked to barkers, and MEOW is B locked to meowers. That is, the replacement 
mapping is {D ó  C; B ó  M}. And the result is: ∀x[D(x)à   B(x)] means dogs bark in Paige’s mind, and it 
means cats meow in Quillan’s mind. At the same time, ∀x[C(x)à   M(x)] means CATS MEOW in Paige’s 
mind, whereas it means DOGS BARK in Quillan’s. That is a developmental role switch between the two 
formulas. 
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ential connections to other concepts, perception, and behavior need to change one by one. For 
minds in which a large number of learned connections are already firmly in place this seems 
to be a fantastic possibility at best. The same is true of color experience inversion in adult 
minds.  
 By the possibility of causal role exchange we mean that the role of an atomic represen-
tation in a cognitive system could have been filled by some other representational atom. We 
call this phenomenon developmental role exchange, since, as we have seen, the least fantastic 
versions assume that the causal role exchange happens in the course of ontogenesis. In fact, 
color experience inversion is not far from practical feasibility (see note 19 above).  
 Due to the possibility of causal role exchange, representational atoms cannot be 
uniquely characterized by their causal/functional role. What does this mean? Although the 
causal role that a representational atom actually fills is characteristic of it within the actual 
system, still the same role could have been filled by different representational atoms in the 
same system at different times (or in different systems of the same type at the same time). 
 Since a representational atom does not fill the role it actually fills necessarily, knowing 
what role it fills (no matter how detailed the description is) does not help in specifiying what 
representational atom it is that actually fills the role. This is what we call the functional 
unanalyzability of representational atoms. 
 
To summarize: 
(1) For representational atoms developmental causal role exchange is possible. 
(2) Thus representational atoms cannot be uniquely characterized by their causal/functional 
role in a give type of system. 
(3) Sensory experiences that are representationally atomic will be functionally unanalyzable 
for this very reason. 
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 However, with respect to atomism, sensory experiences do not differ from Fodorian 
concepts. But intuitively there is a difference – Fodorian concepts, despite being atomic, do 
not raise peculiar problems comparable to atomic sensory experiences. Thus representational 
atomism alone cannot provide a complete explanation of the peculiarities of conscious 
experience. What else do we need? 
Here is a first hint. LOT symbols are theoretical posits. If we accept concept atomism, 
then we may infer from our occurrent thoughts about dogs that DOG, the atomic LOT 
symbol, must have been tokened in our mind. When DOG is tokened, all that the subject is 
aware of, and can report, is the contents of the associated file.24 The tokenings of atomic LOT 
symbols themselves are never reportable; they are never access conscious in any way. 
Sensory experiences, on the other hand, are not theoretical posits: their tokenings in cases of 
attended sensation are the standard examples of access conscious states and reportability. 
Since atomic LOT symbols, unlike sensory experiences, are never access conscious, subjects 
never wonder about their peculiar nature. The first step on the road from representational 
atomism in general to representational atoms with phenomenal character is access 
consciousness.25 
 
4.2 Words, concepts and percepts: what Mary did not know and why 
We are now in a position to see why Mary cannot come to know what it is like to see the 
colors based on her abstract knowledge alone – that is, why she cannot token color 
experiences in her mind before release. Let us look at Figure 2.  
 
                                                
24 Plus current perceptual states if DOG is tokened via the senses. 
25 Another difference is that sensory experiences per se do not have associated files. When they occur, they 
might be introspected, which involves concept deployment (see below). The deployed concepts of experiences in 
turn might have associated files with knowledge about experience. 
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Figure 2. The relation between concepts and experiences in Fodor’s view of cognitive architecture. Note that the 
locking of concepts to their objects is not denoted by any of the arrows in this figure (the same is true of the next 
two figures). What are denoted are some cognitive processes that may participate in locking.  
 
On the Fodorian scheme, concepts are associated with files. Their P-slots contain perceptual 
prototypes which are typically formed on the basis of perception, although in certain cases 
they may also be formed from abstract knowledge. Abstract knowledge (represented by 
Mentalese) can in some cases guide imagery resulting in perceptual prototypes. Such 
prototypes may subsequently be deployed in recognition. How does this happen? 
Combining concepts with prototypes may be accompanied by combining their 
perceptual prototypes. For instance, when PURPLE SAINT-BERNARD is entertained, it is 
typically accompanied by visual memories of some shade of purple, plus that of some big dog 
(depending on the subject’s prior experience with Saint-Bernards and colors). In addition, the 
two stereotypes are typically combined such that, in the recalled dog prototype, the 
representation of brown and white colors typical of Saint-Bernards is replaced by the episodic 
memory trace of some shade of purple. Roughly speaking, the visual image we typically 
construct on entertaining PURPLE SAINT-BERNARD is one that could arise from 
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remembering actual perceptions of Saint-Bernards painted purple. That is, propositional 
representations can, and often do, trigger visual images or impressions. A word about 
Pylyshyn’s views of imagery will help to understand how this might happen. as Pylyshyn has 
repeatedly argued (Pylyshyn, 2002, 2003, 2006), mental images are in many respects unlike 
the visual representations we undergo when actually seeing, and imagination is simulation 
based on tacit knowledge, instead of cognition ”drawing” pictures and ”reperceiving” them. 
According to Fodor and Pylyshyn, we never think in such internally generated pictures. 
Thought and reasoning is realized by propositional representations, still such representations 
are often accompanied by knowledge of how things look. Knowledge of the looks of things 
can be supplied by perceptual prototypes. Based on this knowledge, when we imagine 
something, we simulate its look. We do so by deploying concepts, which in turn guide the 
process of this simulation. Imagery works for simple sensory experiences as well, as long as 
they have at least dimensional structure. For instance, supposing that I have seen reds, blues 
and purples, but no magentas so far, the description that “magenta is slightly bluish red, less 
bluish than purple” can be very helpful for me to imagine, and subsequently recognize, ma-
gentas. We shall call this case Humean simulation (from Hume’s example of the missing 
shade of blue). 
Prototypes may also enrich abstract knowedge when we describe earlier perceptions 
(i.e., encode them in propositional format).26 Now look at Figure 3, which is a representation 
of Mary’s case. 
 
                                                
26 We have a sketch of how propositional representations may be generated from perceptual ones, but it did not 
fit in the present paper. Here it is enough to mention that such a transformation is possible in one way or other. 
When I see a house, I can count its windows, and memorize their number. The resulting semantic memory trace 
can be quite helpful later, when I need to recall the number of the windows. Similarly, I can name the color of 
the house, describe the shape of the roof (perhaps by using geometrical concepts), and so on. Semantic encoding 
of episodic memories is a common process in human cognition. 
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Figure 3.  Mary’s color concepts and her recovery on release from her chamber. 
 
While in her chamber, Mary’s concepts of color and color experience are such that their P-
slots are empty. Since color experiences are representationally atomic, abstract knowledge 
about them (accompanied by perceptual prototypes of other objects and properties) cannot 
simulate their prototype. Humean simulation cannot work because in Mary the chromatic 
dimensions of color space (which are PSFs) have never been activated, therefore she has no 
memory traces of them.27 On release, however, color perception builds up her color 
prototypes, which in turn restore the related cognitive capacities. Figure 4 shows how we 
might acquire complex perceptual prototypes from abstract knowledge. Here the order of 
acquisition of the missing processes and representations is different from that in Mary’s case: 
it begins with the simulation of complex prototypes from abstract knowledge.  
 
                                                
27 Humean simulation is interpolation within a sensory dimension with which the subject is already familiar. 
Mary, however, is not at all familiar with the chromatic dimensions of color space from the first-person perspec-
tive. 
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Figure 4.  Acquisition of complex prototypes from abstract knowledge. Note that the P-slots of HORSE and 
HORN (in the A-slot of UNICORN) – must be filled up in order for abstract knowledge to generate the unicorn 
prototype (see above in this section). 
 
4.3 Knowing experience: the real epistemic barrier 
We think the relation between concepts of experience on the one hand, and concepts of 
neuroscience on the other is by no means more peculiar than that between, say, WATER and 
H2O (Fazekas, 2009; Marras, 2005, Tye, 2008, Ch 3). The crucial epistemic barrier that leads 
to the explanatory gap lies somewhere else.  
 Each and every concept has an associated file with a P-slot and an A-slot, and for any 
concept both these slots can be loaded with relevant information.28 Thus any two concepts can 
be related to one another using information in their A-slots. As we have argued, the strict 
limitation is that, within the file of certain concepts, namely those of atomic experiences, the 
prototype cannot be generated from the abstract knowledge – even though these concepts 
have a highly relevant prototype that can be acquired by other means. This limitation explains 
                                                
28 The only exception is that for some abstract concepts like TRUTH or ELECTRON, no particularly relevant 
perceptual prototype can be found. 
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why Mary cannot come to know what it is like to see the colors while in her chamber.  
 A note about the relation between imagery and knowledge is in order. We think 
imagination does in some cases confer one knowledge, somewhat similarly to the way infer-
ence does (cf. Jackson, 1997, 567). If Quillan believes the premises of an argument, but he 
has not yet thought them through, therefore he does not believe (has not even entertained) the 
conclusion, then he does not know the conclusion. Subsequently he assesses the premises, 
reaches the conclusion, thereby he acquires knowledge of the conclusion. Knowledge acquisi-
tion in this case is a matter of transforming mental representations. If Paige knows what it is 
like to feel cold and warm, see the red of live coal and the interior of a steam engine’s driving 
cab, feel the chilly wind on her face, and has powers of imagination, then she can imagine 
what it is like to drive a steam engine on a stormy day. In this case, exercise of imagination 
gives her knowledge of what it is like. In Roger Shepard’s mental rotation experiments sub-
jects needed to imagine certain objects being rotated in space, and based on this exercise, they 
were able to choose from a number of pictures the one that depicted an object of the same 
shape as the sample. In this case again, it is the transformation of mental representations that 
gives one knowledge of the required sort. However, Mary is not in a position to carry out a 
cognitive exercise that could give her knowledge of what it is like to see colors – nor does she 
know it in any other, more direct ways, based on her knowledge. We are not claiming that it is 
logically impossible for her to imagine what it is like to see colors; but it is nomically impos-
sible. Given the way human brains all operate, there is no mental skill, or cognitive process 
that could yield this sort of knowledge for her. Looking at colors would; stimulating her own 
V4 via a microelectrode might; and if encapsulation were not true, then perhaps some act of 
imagination could do so as well.  
The other epistemic limitation whose cognitive underpinnings we presented above is 
that no meaningful analysis of atomic experiences can be given in terms of structure or 
functional role. The notion of causal role exchange was cited in support of functional 
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unanalyzability, and the representational atomism of sensory experiences explained structural 
unanalyzability. This supplies an understanding of why the explanatory gap arises, why any 
reasonable form of physicalism has to be a posteriori, and also why zombies are conceivable. 
Here is the story.  
Suppose that Paige, a color-sighted neuroscientist possesses E-RED, whose P-slot is 
filled with the perceptual prototype of red, and its A-slot contains contextual information 
pertaining to what objects and circumstances in the environment activate experiences of this 
kind. She then takes cerebroscope measurements of some subjects’ V4 responses and 
discovers a salient response pattern that she calls nrp425, and so forms a concept of it 
(NRP425). She suspects that nrp425 is a sensory experience that, on occurring in someone’s 
V4, has some phenomenal character. Thus the A-slot of Paige’s NRP425 is filled with 
relevant neurological information, but its P-slot is empty – she has no idea of the phenomenal 
character of occurrent nrp425s. Then she decides to run a correlation study: subjects go in her 
cerebroscope, and their V4 responses are recorded while they see different shapes and colors. 
She realizes that subjects’ respond with nrp425 to stimuli they classify as looking 
predominantly red. Paige thus concludes that NRP425 and E-RED are coreferring concepts. 
That is, nrp425, when occurring in a neurotypical subject’s V4, is the experience of red. At 
this point, a two-way information transfer takes place between the files of NRP425 and E-
RED, which consists of three moves: (1) the contextual information in E-RED’s A-slot is 
pasted in NRP425’s A-slot, (2) the neurological information in NRP425’s A-slot is pasted in 
E-RED’s A-slot, finally, (3) the perceptual prototype in E-RED’s P-slot is pasted in 
NRP425’s P-slot. This means, in effect, that the two files get united. Hereafter NRP425 and 
E-RED will be attached to the same united file (still they remain different concepts, because 
their atomic LOT symbols remain distinct).  
There are a few things to notice here. First, before uniting the files, there is no a priori 
(deducibility, rational derivability, etc.) link between the A-slots of NRP425 and E-RED. This 
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is no surprise for us, since we think that there is no a priori link between the A-slots of 
WATER and H2O either (see above). Second, NRP425’s P-slot cannot be filled up based on 
the contents of its A-slot alone (no matter what abstract information we load in it). This is so 
for three reasons. First, encapsulation prevents the simulation of nrp425 from its low-level 
constituent processes (see 3.2). Second, NRP425 is atomic from the first-person perspective, 
therefore no other experiences are of any help in simulating it in imagination (3.1 and 3.2). 
Third, any atomic sensory experience that the subject can entertain is functionally 
unanalyzable (due to the possibility of causal role exchange), therefore none of these 
experiences is a better candidate for identification with nrp425 (viewed from the third-person, 
scientific perspective) than any other.29 To summarize, no matter how much information is 
loaded in NRP425’s A-slot, its P-slot remains empty (unless united with the file of E-RED in 
a correlation study). This is the epistemic gap in our view, and also the reason why 
physicalism must remain a posteriori.30	  
	  
4.4 Introspection and concepts of conscious experience 
In our view, introspection consists in applying concepts of experiences to our experiences. In 
this respect we follow Aydede and Güzeldere, and others (Tye, 2000, 51-54; 2008, 189-192; 
Dretske, 1995, Ch 2). Tye (2008, 189; Ch3) argues that there is nothing special about the 
concepts that we apply to our conscious experience. As should already be obvious, we are in 
agreement with this claim as well, and it too follows from Fodorian psychosemantics. 
On the other hand, we do not follow phenomenal externalists like Tye in thinking that 
in the case of introspective visual awareness our attention necessarily goes outside, onto 
                                                
29 That is, the functional description that might be found in NRP425’s A-slot is no help in such identifications. 
This is because no unique functional characterization can be found in the A-slot of concepts of experiences. Thus 
concepts of atomic experiences offer no hint as to what neural state, characterized in functional terms, they 
might be identical with. 
30 The conceivability of zombies has the same origin: for concepts of experiences, P-slot content (the prototype) 
cannot be generated from the corresponding A-slot content. Thus we cannot see why feeling like this, and also 
feeling in any way at all, should follow from being like that, neurologically.  
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external stimuli (Tye, 2000, p. 51; see also Dretske, 1995, chap. 2; Harman, 1997). Consider 
the case of having the impression of swirling colors when one wakes up at night, or 
daydreaming while driving a car. It sounds  strange to claim that in these cases attention is 
directed outside when there is no actual stimulus that one is attending to. The daydreaming 
driver is prone to making driving errors exactly because he is not attending to his actual 
environment.31 What he attends to is the non-actual (past or merely possible) scenario that he 
is entertaining in imagery, and he is readily aware of the non-real, fictitious nature of what he 
is attending to. The object of his attention is properly characterized in terms of the intentional 
content of his mental states, accompanied by reflective awareness of non-reality. That is, his 
attention is directed inside (i.e., ”on what’s going on in his mind”), in the sense that it is not 
directed at the actual environment. Daydreaming is a type of pretence, which is a voluntary 
act on the part of the subject. 
The case of swirling colors is even more illuminating. Contary to daydreaming, 
experiencing swirling colors at night is not a willful act; it probably arises from some 
spontaneous activity in the visual system. It is not even considered by the subject undergoing 
it as a scenario – it is considered simply as experiences of color. If it is reflected upon, then 
what is thought about it is that it is an experience of some colors. It is readily accompanied by 
a reflective awareness of non-reality, just like daydreaming. The intentional content of 
swirling colors is very much impoverished compared to that of a scenario entertained in 
daydreaming. Still, when one attends to the swirling colors, what attention is directed at is 
intentional objects that are known to be (i.e., at least tacitly recognized as) non-real. This is 
how one can make sense of attention directed inward, in a broadly intentionalist framework.32 
                                                
31 The idea that in being aware of the phenomenal character of our sensations attention goes outside is motivated 
by representational externalism about phenomenal character (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2008; Byrne and 
Hilbert, 1997, 2003; Harman, 1997). 
32 Although this story seems to us compatible with phenomenal externalism, we are narrow intentionalists about 
phenomenal character. In our view what is is like to see the colors (mutatis mutandis for other types of 
experience) supervenes on local states of the brain; still phenonenal characters are properties that external 
objects are represented as having. For more about such views see McLaughlin, 2003; Jakab 2003, 2005, 2006.  
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Next, consider visual search, where attention is surely directed at the outside 
environment, even when there is nothing out there corresponding to what one is looking for 
(like when one is looking for one’s keys in the wrong place). Visual search is on as long as 
the relevant stimulus is not noticed. Seeing the intentional object calls off the search, whereas  
failure to locate it establishes reflective awareness that is is not in the searched location (in 
some cases also that it does not exist). Thus in visual search attention is directed at the actual 
environment, because it is assumed that the intentional object in question exists (and is 
located nearby).  
Daydreaming and the swirling colors case are accompanied by a reflective awareness 
of non-reality. When we hallucinate swirling colors, and act upon our impression as if it 
indicated something real, it is precisely the reflective awareness of non-reality that is missing. 
It is somewhat difficult to decide whether attention is directed at the actual environment in 
hallucination. When we run away from a hallucinated bear, our action is perfectly real and fits 
the environment in many respects (e.g., we avoid obstacles while running). In sum, in 
hallucination there is no reflective awareness of non-reality, plus attention is, at least 
partially, directed at the actual environment. (In addition, there is a gross error regarding what 
is present in that environment.) The last case to quickly consider is that of ordinary 
perception, where attention unquestionably goes outside, and there is no reflextive awareness 
of unreality of the intentional object. Summary in total: when undergoing an experience, 
reflective awareness of non-reality of its intentional object powerfully facilitates inward 
attention, in the sense specified above.  
Reflective awareness of non-reality comes pretty early, namely with children’s ability 
to pretend. According to Alan Leslie (1987; 2002) this capacity is in by two years of age. 
Joseph Perner, who holds a characteristically different view of mentalization development, 
suggests that pretence is in by age 4  (Perner, 1994). Attention goes inside as a result of 
recognizing that experience – the way the world seems to be – is distinct from how it actually 
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is.33 It is not implausible to hold that before age three, children do not conceptualize much of 
perceptual experiences. It is the resulting new attentional focus that will result in suitable 
mentalese symbols locking on to perceptual experiences, we propose.  
As we have argued, phenomenal concepts are not special in any way; they are ordinary 
Fodorian concepts that are locked to sensory experiences. What follows from this is that RED 
and E-RED are two (syntactically) distinct concepts, not one and the same concept with 
ambiguous semantics, as in Aydede and Güzeldere’s theory. In sum, the optimal condition for 
acquiring concepts of experiences is (i) attention going inside, (ii) while one has perceptual 
experience with impoverished intentional content. The latter condition also implies that the 
perceptual representation underlying the experience is not particularly complex (perhaps it is 
just a representationally atomic perceptual state). In such conditions, proto-concepts of 
experiences come to be locked to their objects. 
 It follows from the above that there is a difference between perceptual and introspective 
awareness. Perceptual awareness is direct or primary; it is awareness of external stimuli. For 
instance, we are perceptually aware of object colors by means of their being reliably indicated 
to us by color experience. By contrast, introspective awareness is secondary: it arises from 
"extra" processing of our occurrent perceptual states; processing that is not part of perceptual 
awareness. Such processes include (i) attention turning inward due to reflective awareness of 
non-reality; (ii) the application of concepts of experience, and the formation of relevant belief 
(e.g., ”I am currently undergoing such and such a perceptual experience”), and sometimes (iii) 
focusing attention (processing efforts) on the recall of perceptual memories, or the 
maintaining of traces of perception formed a moment ago, as opposed to gathering new 
information through the senses. 
 
                                                
33 Superseding childhood realism is a related milestone in cognitive development. According to Piaget, children 
come to have an appreciation of mental life after age 6 (see Beilin and Bufall, 1992,  p152). See also Flavell, 
1999. 
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4.5 What makes representational atoms phenomenal 
We have made the point above that only representational atoms that can become widely 
accessible in cognition can be phenomenal. The availability of the outputs of sensory systems 
to the conceptual system, or poisedness, is a key criterion for phenomenality. In this we 
follow the footsteps of others (Evans, 1982, 158; Tye, 2000, 62; Davies, 1997, 311; Aydede 
and Güzeldere, 2005). Both factors are important: (i) availability to conceptual processing and 
that (ii) what’s available are the outputs of the sensory systems. Beliefs (propositional 
representations) do not come with characteristic phenomenology, although when tokened, 
they are readily available to conceptual processing. What is responsible for this difference? 
Here we have a little conjecture to add.  
 First, consider color space. The dimensions along which color experiences are ordered 
(hue, saturation, and lightness; alternatively, red-green level, blue-yellow level, and lightness) 
are also the features that these experiences represent their objects as having. Thus these 
dimensions are aspects of the perceptual content of color experiences. In addition, perceived 
hue, saturation and lightness stand in a very close relationship with the characteristics of the 
representational vehicle of color experiences. This is because the dimensions of perceptual 
color space arise from neural computations on retinal receptor signals, and so the dimensional 
values of particular color experiences in color space are physically coded in neural firings in 
the color vision system. That is, the neural system that underlies the dimensionality of color 
space (that is, the red-green, blue-yellow, and lightness channels) determines (i) the neuronal 
state types that are the color experiences (ii) the phenomenal character of those experiences. 
Therefore, color experiences that are similar in terms of syntacic shape (neuronal type) will be 
similar in terms of phenomenal character (hence in representational content)34, that is, they 
will give rise to similar color appearances.  
                                                
34 The idea that representational content and phenomenal character cannot come apart in the case of color 
experience is not universally accepted, still it has been defended by different authors (e.g., Tye, 2000; Byrne and 
Hilbert, 1997, 2003; see also McLaughlin, 2003). I accept this view in the present argument. 
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 Compare this with non-sensory representational atoms like Fodorian concepts, or free 
morphemes in natural languages. There the characteristics of the vehicle are totally 
independent of its content. The phonological shape or spelling of a word is in most cases 
contingently associated with its meaning. For instance, ’cat’ could come to mean dog in an 
isolated community of English speakers on an island of the Pacific. Similarly, as we saw, an 
atomic symbol of LOT can in principle be locked to all kinds of different properties.  
 Still, the syntactic structure of a representational vehicle constrains the content that it 
can have in a given system; this is true of perceptual and conceptual representations alike. The 
complex LOT formula A&B&C could not mean if A and B then C (assuming an ordinary 
logical processor); nor does it seem easy to conceive of a mind in which the visual percept of 
a circle (i.e., the neural response pattern that in our brains visually represents circles) 
represents rectangles.  
 So here is our point: even though many sensory representations are atomic, there still is 
a quite intimate link between their vehicle and content. This distinguishes them sharply from 
non-phenomenal representational atoms, and thus it may contribute to our understanding of 
why it is the sensory input to conceptual processing that is so characteristically phenomenal. 
A caveat needs to be added, however: this conjecture is so far based on only one example, 
namely color vision. Future analysis will be needed to establish whether this principle 
generalizes to other types of sensory experience. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
We have presented a cognitive account of phenomenal consciousness. The most important 
difference between our view and other current physicalist approaches to consciousness is that 
we think phenomenal concepts do not constitute a special class of concepts. Regarding their 
cognitive and epistemic characteristics, concepts of experience are exactly like other, ”non-
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phenomenal” concepts. When explaining the peculiar features of conscious experience in 
terms of cognitive architecture, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual 
representations, and their interaction with general conceptual structures. Recently M. Tye has 
also proposed that phenomenal concepts are in no way special (Tye, 2008); we agree with him 
on this point. However, our account differs from his in several ways, although both theories 
are physicalist.  
 We found that J. Fodor’s theory of concepts (Fodor, 1998, 2008) is apt for expressing 
our intuitions. We utilized his views of the cognitive architecture of the conceptual system, 
however, our view is neutral with respect to his concept nativism. We cited E. Margolis’s 
account of concept acquisition, which makes it clear that conceptual architecture may be 
essentially Fodorian while leaving out the nativist assumption and substituting it with concept 
learning (Margolis, 1999).  
We used M. Aydede and G. Güzeldere’s theory of phenomenal consciousness for 
purposes of comparison. Aydede and Güzeldere chose Dretske’s informational 
psychosemantics to build an account of phenomenal consciousness. This led them to the 
conclusion that sensory and phenomenal concepts do constitute a special class of concepts. 
We wish to emhasize that this difference between their view and ours is not an uninteresting 
byproduct of technical differences between psychosemantic frameworks, but rather, it is very 
important in the proper understanding of consciousness. We think that if we wish to explain 
the peculiarities of conscious experience, then we should look at experiences (i.e., sensory or 
perceptual representations) in the first place. Concepts of experience play a secondary – 
though by no means unimportant – role in the explanation.  
 We have suggested that the representational atomism of certain sensory experiences is 
a key notion in reconstructing the epistemic gap associated with conscious experience, but 
atomism is not the whole story. It needs to be supplemented by additional principles. This is 
our reply to David Lewis’s contention (Lewis, 1997) that representational atomism is a red 
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herring in explaining consciousness (as he put it, it is one of the ways to miss the point about 
knowing conscious experience). It is not. 
 Representational atomism gives rise to the linguistic inexpressibility, or ineffability, of 
sensory experiences, and also the possibility of their developmental causal role exchange. 
These two factors account for Mary’s epistemic limitations while in her chamber (Jackson, 
1997), the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983, 2007), the conceivability of zombies, and thus 
provide an understanding of why reasonable forms of physicalism must remain a posteriori. 
We also added an account of introspection, and suggested some cognitive features that might 
distinguish representational atoms with phenomenal character from those without it. 
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